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A B S T R A C T
In Amsterdam, houses located on private land and houses with various land-lease contracts coexist. This paper
estimates the market valuation of future land-lease payments on the house price. This is useful for cities (like
Amsterdam) that want to offer infinite lease terms, and can be also used to estimate long-run discount rates. We
investigate the impact of: (i) the number of years that the land lease has been paid in advance and (ii) the
amount that must be paid up front. Depending on the specification, houses on privately owned land are, on
average, 11–13% more expensive than observably equivalent houses with a (non-prepaid) land-lease contract.
Each year that no land lease has to be paid increases the price of a house by approximately 0.2%. Those findings
correspond to a discount rate of 4% per year.
1. Introduction
Knowing the extent to which house prices depend on various land-
lease contracts is of considerable importance to cities that are con-
sidering whether they should introduce or discontinue a system of land
lease. For example, Amsterdam introduced a new system of infinite land
lease in 2017. Existing contracts receive an offer to change their current
contract to the new one and this requires a proper pricing method of
those contracts. There is also some debate in China about what to do
with existing contracts that expire.1 The aim of this paper is to offer a
simple methodology to calculate the market valuation of land lease and
to price the maturity of contracts. Gaining insight into the way financial
obligations in the (far away) future affect current prices also gives
important information on long-run discount rates. Land lease is also
common in several other European cities, including Frankfurt, Helsinki,
London, Stockholm and Vienna.2 In addition, New York has some
houses that are located on land that is owned by the city.
To investigate the market valuation of land lease, this paper uses a
unique data set from Amsterdam based on land-lease contracts and
information on residential real-estate transactions for the period
January 1985 to December 2017.
With regard to our empirical methodology, we first look at the
impact of the number of years that the land-lease rent is paid in advance
(at the moment of a sale) on the house price. The land lease can be paid
up to 75 years in advance in Amsterdam; these payments are not re-
fundable but are transmitted in case the house changes hands. Hence,
the number of years paid in advance can be regarded as exogenous for
the potential house buyers. In addition, we use house fixed effects and
we only use houses in areas of Amsterdam that were developed around
the moment that land lease was introduced in 1896. This last strategy
makes houses with a land-lease contract comparable to houses on pri-
vately owned land. Depending on the exact specification, we find that
paying one year in advance results in an increase of the house price by
approximately 0.2%. Identification comes here from houses that are
sold at various points in time. At those different moments, the number
of years that has to be paid in advance changes. We are also able to use
this exercise to calculate the value of private land, which we find to be
equal to 11–13% of the house price. Our findings imply that a house
with land lease that is paid around 63 years in advance has an almost
identical price as a house that is located on private land.
Next, we analyze the actual land-lease rent of houses for which the
land-lease rent is not paid in advance. In Amsterdam, the land-lease
rent depends on the estimated value of the house in the absence of the
land lease. Hence, one cannot simply estimate the effect of land-lease
rent on house prices by ordinary least squares (OLS) because houses for
which a sizable amount of land lease must be paid would also, in the
absence of the land lease, be more expensive. Therefore, we need an
instrument. It turns out that the conditions prevailing during the year of
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the contract can be used as a suitable instrument because of changes in
the terms of the contract. The terms of the land lease are specified in a
contract called the “general conditions” (GC). This implies that two
houses with the same number of remaining years of the contract can
have a different number of years since the contract start if one of them
is subject to an earlier GC. Since house prices increase in the starting
year of the contract (earlier contracts are more favorable) and since the
land-lease rent increases with the price of the house, this implies that
houses with older contracts pay less land lease. Therefore, contract
length conditional on the number of remaining years of the contract
varies exogenously with the land lease. The estimate differs greatly
between using OLS and instrumental variable (IV) estimation. Using
OLS, land lease is positively associated with house prices. Using IV,
however, we find that a 1 Euro increase of the land-lease rent decreases
the selling price by 52 Euro.
Finally, we use our findings to estimate the long-run discount rate.
Based on some additional assumptions, we find that our estimates of the
discount rate equal 4.08% per year.
A key contribution to the literature of land lease is
Giglio et al. (2015), who look at the impact of leasehold versus freehold
in London and Singapore and find a negative and significant impact of
leasehold – especially when the remaining lease length is relatively
short (in their case, 80 to 100 years). Fesselmeyer et al. (2016) look at
newly built apartments in Singapore. Hjalmarsson and
Hjalmarsson (2009) look at the impact of future rents for co-ops in
Sweden. They conclude that houses with higher rents are overpriced,
once they take into account the discounted value of future rents. They
also find that this overpricing is even more apparent in areas with low
levels of education, indicating that individuals may have difficulties in
understanding the financial obligations of the co-ops in the future.
Janssen (2003) uses Swedish data of income property and compares
houses on private land with houses that pay land lease. He finds an
average increase in selling prices of 16.87 Euro for a one Euro increase
in the land-lease rent. In contrast to the data used by Janssen (2003),
our data allow us to also look at the value for each year that no land
lease has to be paid. Moreover, our data are extremely rich in terms of
observable house characteristics and provide us with a great deal of
within-neighborhood variation in terms of houses on private land and
houses with various land-lease contracts.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the land-lease
system in Amsterdam. Section 3 describes our data sources. Sections 4
and 5 discuss our main results for the two empirical exercises per-
formed in this paper. In Section 6 we discuss how our results can be
used to estimate the discount rate and what the potential pitfalls of
doing this may be. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Land lease
In our context, land lease is defined as the right to hold and use the
land of the city of Amsterdam. To obtain this right, the leaseholder must
pay the city an annual fee, called the “land-lease rent”. Land lease is
different from tenancy because it can be traded without the owner’s
intervention. The city of Amsterdam has used land-lease contracts since
1896. Before that period, all land was sold; after that period, the city of
Amsterdam always remains the owner of the land. Nevertheless, the
city frequently buys land belonging to pre-1896 houses. This means that
there are also land-lease contracts in the older neighborhoods. Houses
built after 1896 do always have a land-lease contract, unless these
houses were built on land that was already sold before 1896. This im-
plies a non-perfect concentration of houses on privately owned land in
the older (and usually more popular) neighborhoods of the city. We
take this into account in our empirical analysis by focusing on the
neighborhoods that were developed around the year 1896 and there-
fore have a mixture of different house types.
An important motivation for having land lease is that, as shown in
the public finance literature, one should tax the most inelastic factors.
Since land does not move or disappear, taxing land has been proposed
ever since Adam Smith and Henry George and – more recently, by
Arnot and Stiglitz (1979). However, land can also be taxed by a prop-
erty tax, which is more transparent.
The duration of a land-lease contract (which we call the period of
lease) is typically 50 years. At the beginning of the lease period, the
terms are specified in a contract called the “general conditions” (GC). At
present, new contracts are based on a contract enacted in 2000 (the
General conditions for perpetual land leases in Amsterdam 2000
(GC2000)). However, land-lease contracts with an earlier starting date
belong to different GCs. The newest conditions are valid at the date of
termination. An important difference between the recent GCs and their
older counterparts concerns the land-lease rent, which was always a
fixed amount before 1966, was sometimes fixed between 1966 and
2000 and is always indexed (based on price inflation) after 2000.
Another difference between the period before 1966 and the period
afterwards concerns the period of lease; it was typically 75 years for the
older contracts, while it is only 50 years for the more recent contracts.
The municipality offers a new contract at the end of the period of
lease.3 As documented by Veen (2004), this is based on the consultation
of independent experts who are typically real-estate agents. Their
procedure is as follows: (1) estimate the total value of the property and
multiply this by the land ratio, which is a parameter that depends on the
neighborhood of the house, and (2) multiply the result by 0.6 in order
to take into account the fact that land with property has less value than
land without property.4 A final aspect of the experts’ price determina-
tion is that, instead of following the short-term fluctuations of the
market, they try to follow the long-term market trends by determining
the total value of the property (in step (1)). After determining the land
price, they calculate the (yearly) land-lease rent simply as a percentage
of the land price.5
As discussed in the Introduction, it is possible to pay the land-lease
rent in advance. Homeowners can pay their land-lease rent at any
moment during the contract. Nevertheless, an important restriction
with respect to pre-payments is the fact that homeowners can only pay
their land-lease rent up to the end of the period of lease. This implies
that the remaining years of the contract and the years paid in advance
are identical in the case of pre-payment. Hence, we use the two ter-
minologies interchangeably for those houses that have a land-lease that
is paid in advance.
3. Data
We use data from three different sources. The data set from the first
source, the city of Amsterdam, contains all information about land-lease
contracts that were effective between 2007 and 2012, distinguishing
between those houses for which the land-lease rent is paid in advance
and the houses for which the land-lease rent is due immediately. In
total, we have 158,380 houses for which the land-lease rent is paid in
advance. Those are all individual residential houses. For these houses,
we have the identifier of the house from the Dutch register, the be-
ginning- and the end date of the contract and the beginning- and the
end date for which the land-lease rent has been paid in advance.
Finally, we have information not only on the general conditions of the
land-lease contract, but also on the special conditions of the payment
period and the exact amount that has to be paid annually during the
3 In very special cases, the municipality is able to terminate further land lease
after the end of the period of lease. In that case, the municipality pays the value
of the houses. However, these occur very rarely; we can safely assume in our
empirical analysis that leaseholders expect their right to lease the land to last
indefinitely.
4 In practice, the land ratio differs between 0.20 and 0.25; see Veen (2004) for
more details.
5 The exact percentage depends on the specific contract and on the district
within the city.
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years of observation. In total, there are 56,242 houses for which the
land-lease rent was not paid in advance and for which annual payments
must be made.
Our second data set, from the Dutch association of real-estate agents
(NVM), contains information on more than 70% of the houses that were
sold in Amsterdam within our observation window. The data set starts
on January 1st, 1985 and ends on December 31st, 2017. The total
number of sales available is 182,241. A large set of characteristics is
available for every house (i.e. the address, the zip code, the selling price
and the size (both in square and cubic feet) – as well as a large set of
other features that may also have an impact on the price of the house;
see Appendix A). The data set also provides an indicator specifying
whether the house comes with a land-lease contract.
Our third data set, an official list from the municipality of all houses
registered in Amsterdam in 2010, contains the identifier from the Dutch
register as well as the address and the zip code. We use this data set to
match the other two data sets, since it contains the address, the zip code
and the registration code that are used for the land-lease contracts of
our first data set.
We merge the second and third data sets in order to obtain the
identifiers from the registers of all houses in the second data set. Here,
we use the street address (with the house number and the addendum)
and the zip-code. We were able to match 136,707 out of 182,241 house
sales that appeared in the data from the real-estate association.6
Next, we merge the resulting data set with the first data set of all
land-lease contracts. Houses located on privately owned land are
identified as those without a corresponding land-lease contract. There
are, however, a few cases where the real-estate agent indicates that the
house is not located on private land, despite the fact that there is no
land-lease contract. If this occurs, then we delete the observation from
our data set (about 2% of the observations). In addition, we merge
houses based on the contract that was in place at the moment of the
sale. Since we have information only on contracts that were effective
over the period 2007 to 2012, some house sales are lost (as we have no
information about the land-lease contract of the house at the moment
the house was sold). We retain 78,852 of the remaining 100,423 house
sales (after deleting the houses that miss some information necessary
for estimation (such as size)).
Table 1A reports some descriptive statistics of our final data set. We
distinguish between private land and land lease. The latter category is
further subdivided into paid in advance and indexed (the lease varies
over time to adjust for changes in the inflation rate) and fixed land
lease. For reasons discussed below, i.e. in Section 5, we omit the data on
the houses with an indexed land lease in our analysis; we thus discuss
the descriptive statistics of these houses only briefly. The descriptive
statistics are for price, size, land-lease rent and the remaining number
of years paid in advance (in case of non pre-paid land lease). In addition
to the mean of these statistics, we also provide the minimum, maximum
as well as the first - and third quartiles. These final statistics are in-
formative on potential outliers and the distribution of the variables that
we investigate. Table 1A shows that less than half of the houses are on
private land and that the prices of these houses are higher than the
prices in the categories paid in advance and fixed land-lease rent. Note
that houses with an indexed land-lease rent are more expensive than
any other category. This is due to the fact that those houses are typically
sold after 2000 and that they are located in very attractive areas in the
southern part of the city. The differences in the distribution of the house
prices are similar to those presented at the mean. Hence, the mean
prices are not affected by outliers of very high or low prices.
Between the different categories, there are some minor differences
in size. This is true for the mean as well as the distribution. Between
neighborhoods however, there are sizable differences. For example,
privately owned land is overrepresented in the more expensive areas in
the city center and the western and southern parts close to the city
center. Furthermore, regarding indexed land rent, the old western and
southern parts of the city are overrepresented, while paid-in-advance
and fixed land-lease rent are overrepresented in less popular areas. We
correct for these differences by using neighborhood dummies in our
empirical analysis.
Fig. 1 shows the shares of the different house types over time. The
majority of houses are on privately owned land but its share is falling
over time. The share of houses that are pre paid has increased from
below 5 to around 40% at the end of the sample period. The share of
houses that has a fixed land lease has decreased because new contracts
always have an indexed land lease. Nevertheless, the share of houses
with an indexed land lease has also decreased in the last years of our
observation window. This has been caused by the sharp increase of
houses that are pre paid. That is, many homeowners that end their
Table 1A
Descriptive statistics of the data set.
Own Paid in Not paid in advance
land advance Fixed Indexed
Including neighborhoods with few observations
Number of observations 42,796 23,855 7007 1206
Price
Mean 282,943 253,320 188,483 274,785
Minimum 28,361 84,857 24,958 27,227
Maximum 1,275,000 750,000 1,111,111 1,175,000
Q25 166,991 179,000 88,487 152,500
Q75 345,000 301,764 192,500 351,000
Size in square feet
Mean 890 1009 945 1023
Minimum 334 431 269 323
Maximum 2637 2153 4618 3606
Q25 624 797 721 646
Q75 1076 1184 1076 1184
Land-lease rent
Mean 0 0 174 864
Minimum 0 0 20 97
Maximum 0 0 1342 3491
Q25 0 0 73.51 433
Q75 0 0 179.24 1112
Remaining number of years paid
in advance
Mean – 38.6 – –
Minimum – 1 – –
Maximum – 82 – –
Q25 – 35 – –
Q75 – 44 – –
Number of neighborhoods 90 90 90 90
Neighborhoods as percentage of
total
City center 30.6 6.2 0.6 3.4
West 26.5 9.1 9.2 16.4
East 10.4 23.2 1.5 9.7
North 1.6 12.7 12.5 12.7
New-West 0.9 30.3 25.7 2.1
South-East 0.2 11.2 9.8 15.4
South 30.0 7.3 40.8 40.4
6 The main reason why we were not able to match all of the houses is that the
house identifier used by the real-estate agent is not always equal to the house
identifier used by the municipality. In particular, the addendum used by the
real-estate agent often differs from the addendum used by the municipality.
Even though we put a great deal of effort into matching those houses with
different addendums, we chose to be quite conservative in order to minimize
the number of wrong matches. Another reason for not being able to match all
houses is that some houses sold between 1985 and 2009 no longer exist in 2010,
and the newly built houses during 2010 did not yet have an official address. We
also delete the houses that are not considered to be a single unit for the Dutch
land register. The problem with these houses is that they do not have a private
contract for land lease with the municipality, but instead have a collective
contract together with the other houses. Hence, we cannot identify the exact
amount of land-lease rent that must be paid by the owner of such a house. This
resulted in the deletion of 44,277 houses.
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period of lease prefer to use the option to pay the rent in advance. Fig. 2
illustrates the development of house prices for the different house types
during our sample period. We can draw the following conclusions from
this figure. First, this figure clearly depicts the overall and stable in-
crease of house prices in the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s.
Second, only a couple of smaller dips appear in our sample period: one
at the turn of the century and one during the global financial crisis.
Finally, apart from the relatively small group of indexed land-lease
houses (especially at the beginning of our period), all other time series
have quite similar patterns. This is especially the case for houses on
privately owned land and with a pre-paid land lease.
We divide Amsterdam into 90 different neighborhoods for our em-
pirical analysis, using the definitions based on Statistics Amsterdam;
within a given neighborhood, houses and economic status of the owners
are thus approximately homogeneous. Our empirical implementation is
based on comparisons within neighborhoods. If some neighborhoods
contain only houses on privately owned land or only houses with a land
lease, then we cannot separately identify a neighborhood and a land-
lease effect. This led us to delete all neighborhoods that do not have at
least ten observations from houses on private land, land-lease rent paid
in advance or land-lease rent not paid in advance. In total, this corre-
sponds to a deletion of 63 neighborhoods. Descriptive statistics of the
final data set can be found in Table 1B. Since we focus on neighbor-
hoods that were developed around the period of the introduction of the
land lease in 1896, our identification method is similar to the popular
regression discontinuity approach. That is, the discontinuity is based on
the year in which the land (and not the house) was developed, i.e.
before or after 1896.
The descriptive statistics in Tables 1A and 1B are quite similar apart
from the fact that houses with a land lease that must be paid up front
(either with an indexed or a fixed land lease) are on average cheaper.
This is related to the above remark that there is a relatively large
number of houses with land lease in popular areas.
4. Empirical analysis of prepaid land lease contracts
4.1. Theoretical considerations
Before we present our empirical analysis, we start with a simple
model in order to explain our exact specifications. We denote the price
in year t of a house that is paid RYPA years in advance by PtRYPA and
denote Pt to be the price for an identical house that is built on privately
owned land (for ease of exposure we use RYPA for remaining years paid
in advance). Since the houses are identical, we assume that the dis-
counted outlays should also be identical, which implies that
= + +P P C s dsexp( ) ,t t t sRYPA RYPA (1)
where Cs represents the land-lease rent that needs to be paid in period s.
The term ρ equals either a discount rate or the market interest rate. For
the latter interpretation, Eq. (1) has the amount necessary to buy a
house on privately owned land on the left-hand side, while it has the
amount necessary to buy a house with a land-lease contract on the
right-hand side. From our discussion in Section 2, we know that the
land-lease payments are a percentage of the house price on privately
owned land. For the sake of keeping things simple here, we fix this
percentage to c and assume that the growth rate of the house prices
equals g. This implies that future land-lease payments in period +t s,
i.e. +C ,t s equal cPtexp (gs). Hence, after substitution and solving for the
Fig. 1. Development of the share of house types over the sample period.
Fig. 2. Development of house prices over the sample period.
Table 1B
Descriptive statistics of the data set.
Own Paid in Not paid in advance
land advance Fixed Indexed
Excluding neighborhoods with few observations
Number of observations 21,340 5727 733 390
Price
Mean 293,679 247,481 139,163 269,185
Minimum 28,361 84,857 24,958 56,723
Maximum 1,275,000 748,737 1,066,384 1,175,000
Q25 166,991 175,000 61,260 172,000
Q75 351,778 294,800 159,980 314,500
Size in square feet
Mean 937 861 825 946
Minimum 334 431 269 323
Maximum 2637 2099 4618 3229
Q25 646 646 646 646
Q75 1087 1044 990 1130
Land-lease rent
Mean 0 0 87.51 683
Minimum 0 0 20 97
Maximum 0 0 1009 3079
Q25 0 0 28.13 289
Q75 0 0 107.54 780
Remaining number of years paid
in advance
Mean – 40.1 – –
Minimum – 21 – –
Maximum – 79 – –
Q25 – 36 – –
Q75 – 44 – –
Number of neighborhoods 27 27 27 27
Neighborhoods as percentage of
total
City center 32.3 23.1 4.3 6.6
West 14.8 16.7 66.1 42.7
East 11.9 24.6 11.0 26.6
North 0.8 19.9 0.6 3.1
New-West 0.9 4.0 14.6 1.5
South-East 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
South 39.3 11.7 3.3 19.5
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integral, we can rewrite (1) as
=P P c
g
g1 ( / ) exp( ( )RYPA).t tRYPA (2)
Rewriting the equation and taking logarithms of the left and the right
hand side results in
= +P P c
g
glog log log 1 exp( ( )RYPA) .t tRYPA
(3)
Eq. (3) shows that the logarithm of the price of a house that is prepaid
for RYPA years equals the logarithm of the price of that house when it
would be situated on own land plus an additional term which is ne-
gative and decreases in absolute terms with RYPA. Using a Taylor series
expansion, the term can be arbitrarily well approximated by a higher
order polynomial in the number of years paid in advance, i.e.
+P Plog log (RYPA),t tRYPA
where Ψ is a polynomial of the number of years paid in advance, i.e.
= + + …(RYPA) RYPA0 1 . Finally, if we define = +P X Ulog t
where X contains observed and U unobserved characteristics of the
house on private land, we can write7
= + +P X Ulog (RYPA) .tRYPA
The most important lesson from this stylized model is that we should
use a log-linear specification in case we want to estimate the impact of
pre-payment (and privately owned land) on the price of the house.
4.2. Results
We estimate the following equation:
= + + + +P X Ulog RYPA OWN (Month ) ,i i i i i i (4)
where Pi is the selling price of house i, and X and RYPA are defined
above. Recall that the number of remaining years paid in advance
(RYPA) is transferred to the buyer, which will likely impact the house
price. We set this variable equal to zero in case there is no land-lease
contract (hence, the land is owned by the owner of the house), while
the dummy variable OWNi equals one in such a case.8 Note that this
does not affect the interpretation of the coefficient γ, while the coeffi-
cient δ measures the impact of having no land-lease contract relative to
a land-lease contract without any pre-payments. Finally, ν(Monthi) is a
function of the month of sale and takes account of the changes in house
prices over time. In our empirical implementation, ν(Monthi) is a full set
of dummy variables for each month during our observation window
from January 1985 to December 2017 (i.e. 395 dummy variables). The
term Ui is a stochastic error term.
We exclude houses for which no land lease is paid in advance be-
cause these houses can be either on an indexed or a fixed land-lease
payment scheme (see the discussion in the previous section). For some
of the houses that have a fixed land-lease rent, the land lease may be
very low (old contracts), a situation which resembles that in which the
land lease is pre paid.
The first column of Table 2 lists the results. Besides the regressors
listed in that table, we use the type of house, a categorical variable for
the type of location of the house, whether the house is a monument or
has a garage, balcony, attic, garden and/or roof terrace, the type of
heating, period of construction, type of insulation, number of bath-
rooms, whether the house is newly built, and whether the house is
(partly) let and/or is used as residential income property. Details about
most variables can be found in Appendix A. Moreover, we use
neighborhood dummies and neighborhood dummies interacted with
size in square feet, construction period, and year in which the sale took
place. As expected, we find that a house on privately owned land is
more expensive. The coefficient of the OLS estimation of 0.1126 means
that houses with a land-lease contract that has not been paid in advance
have a 11.26% lower price than houses on own land. In addition, we
find that the number of years remaining before the land-lease rent has
to be paid (because the previous owner paid this in advance) has a
significant and positive effect on the house price: each year that is paid
in advance results in an increase of 0.17% of the expected selling price
in the OLS estimator. This implies that houses for which the lease has
been paid log 1.1126/log 1.017 ≈ 63 years in advance sell at about the
same price as a house on privately owned land. In addition, using the
average house price of 247,481 Euro for these houses (see Table 1B), we
can derive that paying one year in advance results in a 421 Euro in-
crease in the sales price. This is somewhat lower than the 683 Euro per
year that must be paid for houses with an indexed land rent.
The other coefficients presented in Table 2 have the expected signs.
The house price increases with size, where size is measured in either
square or cubic feet as well as by the number of rooms.
We present the estimates of the time effects in Fig. 3. Again, we find
a sharp increase in house prices during the 1980s and 1990s as well as
in the recent period since 2015. The two periods during which the
Dutch housing market was in a downturn (i.e. 2002–2004 and
2009–2014) are also clearly visible.
We also estimated (4) using a flexible specification for the years in
which the land-lease rent is paid in advance where we include a dummy
for every five remaining years that are paid in advance (i.e. 0–5 years,
5–10 years, and so forth). The results of this flexible specification ap-
pear in Fig. 4 with the values of the dummies on the y-axis and the
remaining years paid in advance (RYPA) on the x-axis. For comparison,
we also draw the line that we obtained from the estimate of γ using the
results of the first column of Table 2. The number of observations per
interval is shown in Fig. 5. Based on Fig. 4, we conclude that the linear
specification adequately approximates the more flexible specification.
The only exception is the large variation that comes from the houses for
which the contract must be renewed in less than 25 years, or more than
60 years. This can be explained by the fact that we have very few ob-
servations for those houses (as shown in Fig. 5).
We can control for unobserved house characteristics by restricting
the attention to repeated sales. This implies the following modification
with respect to (4):
= + + + + +P X Vlog RYPA OWN (Month ) ,ik ik ik i i ik ik (5)
where Pik is now the selling price of house i when sold for the kth time.
The house-specific effect αi includes any unobserved characteristic af-
fecting the average selling price. The stochastic residual Vik contains
buyer and seller characteristics and is supposed to be independent of
the observed and unobserved characteristics, including the number of
years that the land-lease rent is paid in advance. Our specification can
be interpreted as an implementation of the hedonic repeated sales price
model (see, for example, Clapp and Giaccotto, 1998 which implies that
all benefits and restrictions of their method also apply here. Note that
all characteristics that can be expected not to change over time cancel
out when using a fixed-effects regression. This implies that we are no
longer able to estimate the impact of having a land-lease contract re-
lative to owning the land. Also note that, even though we do not include
time-varying neighborhood characteristics, such as crime rates and in-
come levels, we do include a neighborhood-specific second-order
polynomial of year of sale, which is able to capture these changes over
time.9
7 With a little abuse of notation, we also include the approximation error here
in the error term U.
8 Note that, compared with Section 4.1, δ equals ,0 while γ and ψ1 are
identical.
9 We decided not to include a full set of dummy variables for the interaction
effects, due to the high number of variables that would be needed by such a
strategy.
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Note that we can identify both the year fixed effects and the coef-
ficients of RYPA due to the fact that we also use the data from the
houses that are built on own land. These houses do not change their
RYPA from one sale to the next since that variable is always equal to
zero. Moreover, houses can change their land-lease contract during the
period of observation. However, this happened for only one house in
our data sample and this implies that we are not able to allow for a
separate set of year dummies for houses on own land and houses for
which the landlease is paid in advance. This implies that we make the
implicit assumption that the time varying factors like the business cycle
affect the prices of all houses similarly, irrespective of the land lease
contract. Given the fact that we already allow for separate house price
trends for different neighborhoods, we do not consider the assumptions
of equal price developments to be very restrictive. Another reason why
we think we can defend the assumption of equal price developments is
that we already made the two groups as similar as possible by looking
only at regions that were developed around the year 1896.
The second column of Table 2 lists the results of a random-effects
model; the results of the within- and first-difference estimators appear
respectively in columns 3 and 4. The estimates of land lease versus
private land from the random effects and OLS regressions are quite
close. The same is true for the effect of an additional year of land lease
paid in advance.
The within- and first-difference estimators also give similar effects
of the number of years paid in advance on the house price. Fig. 6 reports
the values of the time-dummy variables for the within difference esti-
mator. We find no substantial difference between this figure and the
one presented for OLS.
Although within- and first-difference estimators allow for the fact
that there are unobserved differences between houses which are cor-
related with the right-hand side variables, these estimators are also less
efficient. We therefore test the necessity of using fixed effects by
adopting the alternative Hausman test introduced by Arellano (1993).
Note that the alternative Hausman test takes account of potential
Fig. 3. Estimates of the time effects for the standard regression. Notes: The y-
axis is based on the time-dummy variables estimated from the specification of
the first column of Table 2.
Table 2
Results of the impact of the number of years that the land lease is paid in ad-
vance on house prices. All specifications have log house price as the dependent
variable. Apart from the regressors listed in the table, we correct for a full set of
(395) month dummy variables, type of house, a categorical variable for the type
of location of the house, maintenance outside and inside (9 point scale), whe-
ther the house is a monument and/or has a garage, balcony, attic, garden and/
or roof terrace, type of heating, period of construction, type of insulation,
number of bathrooms, whether the house is newly built, and whether the house
is (partly) let and/or is used as residential income property. Details about most
variables can be found in Appendix A. Moreover, we use neighborhood dum-
mies and neighborhood dummies interacted with size in square feet, con-
struction period, and year in which the sale took place. Heteroskedasticity ro-
bust standard errors appear between parentheses.
OLS Random Within First Land rent
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Cubic feet 0.9125 0.7372
(0.2504) (0.2047)




27,076 27,076 28,112 28,112 29,405
Number of houses 15,421 15,421 15,657 15,657 16,740
R2 0.9538
R within2 0.9235 0.9234
Fig. 4. Relationship between house price and the number of years that no land
lease has to be paid.
Fig. 5. Data count of the remaining years paid in advance.
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heteroskedasticity in the error term and is identical to the standard
Hausman test in case of homoskedasticity. The value of this test is equal
to 2352. Under the null-hypothesis of no correlation, this test statistic
follows a χ2-distribution with 417 degrees of freedom, which implies
that this null hypothesis is rejected. An important reason for the cor-
relation is that the coefficients of subjectively stated maintenance are
quite different when we use the fixed-effects methods.10 This indicates
that there is a high level of correlation between unobserved hetero-
geneity and the maintenance of the house. Comparing the results be-
tween columns 3 and 4 with the results between columns 1 and 2 re-
veals that the impact of one additional year of advance payment on the
house price is very similar for the fixed- and random-effects estimators.
Using the error term of the first-difference estimator yields an es-
timator of the realization of U Uit i t, 1; regressing this on its lag gives a
coefficient of -0.385. Its t-value for the null-hypothesis that it does not
differ from −0.5 equals 2.25 and is hence rejected. As described in
Wooldridge (2010), this test can also be interpreted as a test against no
serial correlation of the error term in (5). Although both estimators are
consistent even in the presence of serial correlation, this implies that
the within estimator is in this case less efficient than the first-difference
estimator.
As a robustness check, we also included the houses that were not
paid in advance. These results are listed for the within estimator in the
last column of Table 2, which reveals how negligibly they affect our
results.
5. Empirical analysis of land lease contracts that are not prepaid
5.1. Theoretical considerations
We use the same model as in Section 4.1 for the impact of the land-
lease rent. The model can be immediately translated to houses with an
indexed land lease (by setting the number of years paid in advance
equal to zero), but it becomes somewhat more complicated in the case
of a fixed land-lease rent. Suppose that LL is the fixed annual land-lease
rent that must be paid up to the end of the period of lease. We define T
as the number of years until the end of the period of lease (i.e. the
number of years for which the land-lease rent is fixed). Then, we can
again obtain the prices by equating the total amount necessary to buy a
house on privately owned land and the total amount necessary to buy a
house that has a fixed land-lease rent for the next T years:
= + + +P P s ds cP g s ds(LL) LL exp( ) exp( ( ) ) ,t tT
T
t T0
where P (LL)tT is the price of the house when it pays a fixed land-lease
rent for the next T years. The second term accounts for the payments
that must be made until the end of the period of lease. The last term
accounts for the payments that need to be paid after the period of lease
has ended; those are identical to the payments for pre-paid houses.
Solving for the integrals and doing some rewriting results in
=P P T cP
g
g T(LL) LL (1 exp( )) exp( ( ) ).tT t t (6)
For the simple case where T is large and g is small, such that




g T(LL) LL exp( ( ) ).tT t t (7)
Eq. (7) shows that houses on landlease have a price equal to the price of
that same house if it would have been built on private land, minus two
terms. The first term is related to the amount of landlease that must be
paid during the current period of lease. The second term is related to
the amount of land lease that needs to be paid after the end of the land-
lease period. This term becomes less important in the case that the
current period ends far in the future. Again, we can approximate the
last term arbitrarily well using a polynomial of T. Hence,
=P P T(LL) LL 1 ( ),tT t (8)
Fig. 6. Estimates of the time effects for the within-difference estimator. Note: The y-axis is based on the time-dummy variables estimated from the specification of the
third column of Table 2.
10 We have not reported these results here, but they are available upon re-
quest.
11 Note that if this restriction is not satisfied, then we need to use cross terms
in our empirical analysis. Our empirical results indicate that our assumption is
reasonable.
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where Φ is a polynomial of T. This implies that unlike the instance of a
pre-paid land lease, the best specification is in this particular case to
look at a linear rather than a log-linear specification. Among other
things, it implies that a house that has a ten-times higher land-lease rent
should also have a ten-times higher percentage decrease in the house
price, compared to a house without any land-lease rent. Note that the
actual problem might also be more complicated, since the payments of
land-lease rent may vary over time – even for those houses that have a
fixed land-lease contract, (i.e. after the contract has expired). We
therefore also take this into account in (some of) our specifications,
using non-linear specifications as robustness checks.
5.2. Baseline specification
We use the following specification:
= + + + +P X T ULL (Year) ,i i i i i i (9)
where Pi is again the price of house i and LL and T are as defined above.
Ui is again an error term. The term Ti is included to capture the third
term of Eq. (6) (or (8)). The term ν(Yeari) is a set of time dummy
variables. Due to the low number of observations, we here use biannual
dummy variables instead of monthly dummies.
We would like to know whether θ is negative and significantly
different from zero: that is, to what extent do buyers take the future
payments into account? However, the estimation of (9) is complicated
by the way in which land-lease contracts are renewed: houses with
attractive unobserved characteristics will come with a higher land-lease
rent. Hence, the unobserved characteristics that are captured in Ui are
likely to be positively correlated with LLi, and this will result in an
upward bias of θ. This implies that we should either use repeated sales
or employ an instrument to solve the endogeneity problem. Using re-
peated sales is not an attractive exercise here since there are only 1123
house sales and the majority of these houses (representing 733 house
sales) do not have any variation in the land-lease rent over time, while
the variation in the land-lease rent of the other houses is a deterministic
function of time. Luckily, due to the exogenous variation in the general
conditions, there are some good instruments available based on the
year in which the last contract started.
We explain the main features of these instruments below – but be-
fore we do this, it is best to start the discussion with an explicit model of
LLi,
= + + +X Z µ WLL (Year) ,i i i i i
where Zi is a set of instruments: i.e. a set of random variables that have
an impact on the (mean) land-lease rent but not directly on the (mean)
price of the house. The random variable Wi can best be interpreted as
capturing all unobserved characteristics that affect the land-lease rent.
It is clear that this variable Wi is correlated with Ui due to the fact that
all unobserved characteristics that affect the selling price of the house
will also affect the land-lease rent. The term μ(Yeari) is a set of biannual
year dummy variables.
As explained in the Introduction, we can exploit the variation in the
general conditions over time to solve for the endogeneity problem
discussed above. Houses with different starting dates of the present
(contract) period of lease have different conditions concerning whether
the land-lease rent is fixed during the period of lease or whether it
changes over time. This implies that two houses that have the same
observed and unobserved characteristics can have different land-lease
rents based on the different general conditions of the contracts. Still, a
variable that indicates whether the house has a contract with a fixed or
variable land-lease rent is problematic since having a contract with a
fixed land-lease rent is beneficial in itself. That is, it affects not only the
present land-lease payments but also all land-lease payments to be
made in the future.12 Therefore, we focus only on houses with a fixed
land-lease rent. Even for these houses there is variation with respect to
the period of lease and hence the total number of years that the land
lease rent is fixed.
Fig. 7 lists the frequencies of the contract period. For most contracts,
the total number of years is 75, although some houses feature a
somewhat shorter (typically 50 years) or longer contract period of lease
(typically 125 years). Again, this is related to the period in which the
contract expired for the last time and is not based on house char-
acteristics. This implies that two houses with the same number of re-
maining years of the contract can have a different number of years since
the start of the contract. Consider for example, two identical houses.
Suppose that for the first house the number of years since the contract
start is 50 years, while for the second house it is only 25 years but each
still has 25 remaining years for which the land-lease rent is fixed. Ob-
viously, the first house has a lower land-lease rent than the second
house. The first house is just as attractive as the second but the land-
lease rent it pays is based on an assessed value from an earlier period
(50 years ago versus 25 years ago), which is typically more favorable.
Consequently, we have an exogenous variation based on the number of
years that the land-lease rent was fixed in the original contract. Natu-
rally, this is conditional on the remaining years of the contract and the
construction period of the house.
We realize that only focusing on the fixed land-lease rent has the
drawback that most houses in our working sample have a low land-
lease rent. The last decile of the land-lease rent is still only equal to 122
Euro. Therefore, we do not want to give an interpretation of our results
for newer contracts that typically have a much higher land-lease rent.
We only want to investigate whether – even for these contracts – there
is an impact of the land lease on the selling price of the house.
Table 3 lists the results of the estimation of Eq. (9). The first column
of Table 3 uses only basic regressors such as square feet (up to a second
degree polynomial), cubic feet, neighborhood, year, year squared,
garden, maintenance (inside and outside) and the number of rooms.
Even though this is already a rich set of controls, Table 3 clearly in-
dicates the endogeneity bias resulting in a positive and significant
coefficient for the land-lease rent.
The second column corrects for the same set of regressors as in the
previous section; this results in a very small and insignificant value of
the coefficient of the land-lease rent.
The third column of Table 3 lists the results of our instrumental
variable estimation method using only the total number of years of the
Fig. 7. Frequencies of the contract period among houses with a fixed land-lease
rent. Notes: The x-axis is the number of years of the contract at the start of the
contract period.
12 The opportunity to use only houses with one remaining year of the contract
does not work here, due to the lack of observations.
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contract as an instrument. We find that the impact of the land-lease rent
becomes negative and significantly different from zero. The F-test for
the relevance of the instrument is equal to 197, the null hypothesis of
an irrelevant instrument is therefore rejected. This is also confirmed by
the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification test statistic, which equals 21.2
and has a p-value virtually equal to zero. A Hausman test with the null
hypothesis that the land-lease rent is exogenous is also rejected with a
p-value that is virtually equal to zero.13
The fourth column of Table 3 takes account of the fact that the
impact of the land lease may be larger for houses that still have a long
period before the end of the contract. Note that this is also represented
in the second term of the right-hand side of Eq. (6), since the term
T1 exp( ) becomes larger when T is larger. This column therefore
presents the results of a regression in which we also include the number
of years of the contract period interacted with a dummy variable that
indicates whether there are at least 40 years remaining in the present
period of lease. Roughly 41% of the houses have at least this number of
remaining years. Since we expect that the impact of having to pay a
higher land-lease rent is greater when the number of remaining years is
higher, the expected value for the additional coefficient included in the
fourth column of Table 3 is negative and this is indeed what we find in
our analysis. It is also hardly surprising that we find that the original
coefficient for the land-lease rent becomes smaller. Neither coefficients
are significantly different from zero. However, the total impact of the
contracts with 40 remaining years is the sum of the two coefficients,
which equals −54.52, with a standard error equal to 22.84. Hence, the
p-value only equals 1.7%. The fact that the coefficient for all contracts is
no longer significant at a 10% level, (i.e. the p-value equals 11%) in-
dicates that our earlier results were mainly affected by the houses with
a greater number of remaining years in the contract. The relevance-of-
instruments test gives a value of 331, implying once again that the
instruments are highly relevant. The Kleibergen-Paap under-
identification statistic now becomes equal to 35.5, with a p-value vir-
tually equal to zero. Finally, the Hausman test statistic to test against an
exogenous regressor is again easily rejected. This implies that also using
this set of instruments indicates that the land-lease rent is highly en-
dogenous.
We also investigate whether the relationship between log land-lease
payments and the log house price might be non-linear by including both
log land-lease rent and log land-lease rent squared in the regression. We
use the control function approach here to correct for endogeneity (see
for example Wooldridge, 2010). That is, we once again use the same
exclusion restriction as in column IV of Table 3 – but use the residual
term of the first-stage regression as a regressor in the second-stage re-
gression. In order to obtain a higher level of flexibility, we also include
this control variable squared in our second-stage regression. The results
of this exercise appear in the fifth column of Table 3. The negative
elasticity in house prices in response to an increase in the land-lease
rent is smaller for high levels of the land lease. Note that this conclusion
can be made on the relatively small range of land-lease rents among the
houses with a fixed land lease. Hence, extrapolations of this result to,
for example, the higher land-lease rents of the houses with an indexed
land lease would be based on the parametric form assumed.
The other coefficients presented in Table 3 again have the expected
signs. The price of the house increases with the size of the house as
measured in square and cubic feet. The number of rooms does not, in
general, have a (positive) impact on the size of the house, suggesting
that the other size indicators contain sufficient information about the
size of the house. The number of remaining years untill the end of the
contract has no impact on the price, either.
Table 4 lists the results of two additional specifications of Eq. (9).
First, we use a log specification in the first column, implying that our
coefficient is in terms of percentages. Hence, we find that a one Euro
increase of the land-lease rent would result in a 0.46% reduction in the
price. Second, we use a log-log specification, implying that our coeffi-
cient is in terms of elasticities. Here, we find that a 1% increase of the
land-lease rent decreases the house price by 0.09%.
5.3. Heterogeneous effects
As a final robustness check, we investigate potential heterogeneity
in the impact of the land-lease rent on the house price. We allow for the
possibility that the land-lease rent can affect the house price differently
for two houses that are identical in terms of observed characteristics. A
reason for such heterogeneity is the variation in unobserved char-
acteristics of the houses that may affect how land rent impacts the
house price. Another reason is the variation in the remaining contract
length. Although we took it into account in the analysis, it is unlikely to
enter the equation in an additive structure that is used in a standard
instrumental variables approach. That is, the market prices are likely
affected by the behavioral concerns of individual home buyers who take
into account their preferences of consumption in different time periods.
In our companion paper, Gautier and van Vuuren (2018), we use a
structural form approach to solve this problem, but the identification of
our model requires many assumptions and a parametric utility function.
In this paper we decided to follow another route, electing to estimate a
very flexible reduced-form model to investigate not only the potential
role of heterogeneity but also whether policy-relevant objects can be
affected by such heterogeneity.
In order to investigate the impact of heterogeneity, we specify the
house price function as follows:
Table 3
Results of the impact of land-lease rent on house prices. All specifications have
house price per square meter as the dependent variable. Apart from the re-
gressors listed in the table, we correct for bi-annual year dummies, type of
house, a categorical variable for the type of location of the house, whether the
house is a monument or has a garage, balcony, attic, garden and/or roof ter-
race, the type of heating, period of construction, type of insulation, number of
bathrooms, whether the house is newly built, and whether the house is (partly)
let and/or is used as residential income property. Details about most variables
can be found in Appendix A. Moreover, we use neighborhood dummies and
neighborhood dummies interacted with year in which the sale took place. We
estimate the following specifications: (I) OLS with a limited set of regressors
(see text), (II) OLS with the full set of regressors, (III) IV with only log land-lease
rent as the regressor, (IV) IV with the interaction term of log land-lease rent and
remaining years ≥ 40, (V) Control Function approach with log land-lease rent
square as the additional regressor. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
appear between parentheses.
OLS IV/Control variable
I II III IV V
Land lease 61.56 6.390 −51.60 −46.18 161.6
(15.08) (12.15) (22.96) (28.89) (96.02)
Log land lease × −8.338
> 25 yrs. remaining (35.63)
(Log land lease)2 −1.872
(0.9161)
Square feet −14.04 163.6 40.25 −12.10 −12.54
(22.12) (57.43) (16.20) (1.901) (1.901)
Square feet2 ( × 1000) 9.190 −25.18 −0.6033 2.104 2.208
(5.057) (8.026) (3.261) (0.3265) (0.3195)
Cubic feet 12.71 2.523 7.762 0.0386 0.0386
(1.184) (0.9566) (1.444) (0.1051) (4.48)
Number of rooms 2914 1554 222.1 −105.1 −84.337
(2508) (1439) (1889) (155.3) (159.1)
Years till contract end
( × 100)
−0.0087 −4.538 10.94 −9.428
(0.0265) (4.658) (6.738) (4.745)
Number of observations 733 733 733 733 733
R2 0.8917 0.9653 0.9188 0.9189 0.9207
13 The statistic takes an extremely high value. We therefore decided against
reporting it here.
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=P g X U( , LL , Year , ),i i i i i (10)
where g is an arbitrary function and the other variables are as in-
troduced above. The interpretation of this relationship is that we as-
sume the house price to be specified by the observed characteristics, Xi,
of the house, the land rent that needs to be paid by the owner of the
house, the year of transaction and a set of unobserved characteristics.
Note that this specification is more general than the one that we had in
the previous section, where we assumed the error term to be additive to
the observed characteristics, including the land rent. This new specifi-
cation allows for observationally equivalent houses to be differently
affected by the land lease. It is an empirical question whether this more
general model results in different estimates in comparison to the re-
strictive version. We assume the following specification for land-lease
rent:
= h X Z WLL ( , , Year , ),i i i i i
where h is an unspecified function. The variable Zi is the set of instru-
ments introduced in Section 5.2. The random variable Wi is an error
term, that can be interpreted as any unobserved characteristic that af-
fects the land-lease rent. If Ui is independent of Wi, then the estimation
of objects related to the house price function of Eq. (10) is straight-
forward. Unfortunately, such an approach does not work in our case
due to the way in which the land-lease rent is determined, implying a
dependence between Wi and Ui. Hence, a high level of Wi implies not
only a high level of LLi, but also a high level of Ui, making it difficult to
investigate the causal impact of an increase in LLi on Pi. Therefore, we
again use the –number of years of the contract– as an instrument.
Moreover, we use the control function approach of Imbens and
Newey (2009) to solve for our endogeneity problem. This method can
be seen as the nonparametric and nonseparable counterpart of standard
IV.14
Based on this, we estimate the average derivative of Pi with respect
to LLi. The interpretation of such a derivative is that for a small value of
Δ, the average derivative times Δ measures the average change in the
house price (per square meter) in the total population when the land-
lease rent increases by an amount equal to Δ. The average derivative is
a policy relevant object whenever the policy maker uses a linear utility
function. In a linear regression model, this average derivative is, by
definition, equal to the regression coefficient. This is not necessarily the
case for the model of this section, due to the possibility of non-linear-
ities as well as heterogeneity in the effects. That is, if the model of this
section is correct and we still estimate the restrictive version of the
model presented in the previous section, then the estimated coefficients
cannot be interpreted as average derivatives. Instead, they form a
complex and uninterpretable weighted average of individual-specific
effects –with the weights depending on the actual and unknown correct
specification.
Estimates of the average derivative are reported in Table 5, where
the 95-percent confidence intervals are calculated using bootstrap
sampling. We use a sample size of the bootstrap equal to 1000. Our
results are in line with the results from Table 3: we still find a negative
and significant impact of the land-lease rent. Nevertheless, we do find
that the impact is somewhat smaller than what we estimated in
Section 5.2.
6. Land lease and the discount rate
The previous sections showed that there is an impact of future land-
lease payments on the house price even when the outlays occur far into
the future. Although we have thus far refrained from making any as-
sumption about the interpretation of ρ in (for example in Eq. (1), many
researchers (including Giglio et al., 2015 have interpreted it to equal
the discount rate. This provides the opportunity for us to estimate such
a discount rate. Following Gautier and van Vuuren (2018), we calibrate
the value of c in Eq. (1) to equal 0.5%, while the house price increase
(i.e. g) is set at 2%; further, we set the number of years paid in advance
equal to its mean of 38.6. In addition, our random effects regressions of
Section 4.2 resulted in the conclusion that houses on own land are
12.85% more expensive when the RYPA equals zero, implying that the
left-hand side of Eq. (2) equals




Results of the impact of land-lease rent on house prices. All specifications have
house price per square meter as the dependent variable. Apart from the re-
gressors listed in the table, we correct for bi-annual year dummies, dummy
variables of month of sale, type of house, a categorical variable for the type of
location of the house, whether the house is a monument or has a garage, bal-
cony, attic, garden and/or roof terrace, the type of heating, period of con-
struction, type of insulation, number of bathrooms, whether the house is newly
built, and whether the house is (partly) let and/or is used as residential income
property. Details about most variables can be found in Appendix A. Moreover,
we use neighborhood dummies and neighborhood dummies interacted with
year in which the sale took place. We estimate the following specifications: (I)
OLS with a limited set of regressors (see text), (II) OLS with the full set of
regressors, (III) IV with only log land-lease rent as the regressor, (IV) IV with the
interaction term of the log land-lease rent and the remaining years ≥ 40, (V)
Control Function approach with the log land-lease rent square as the additional




Land lease −0.0046 −0.0941
(0.0012) (0.0268)
Square feet 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Square feet2 ( × 1000) −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Cubic feet 0.00002 0.00003
(0.00001) (0.00001)
Number of rooms 0.0079 0.0106
(0.0082) (0.0084)
Years until contract end ( × 100) 0.0005 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Number of observations 733 733
R2 0.9510 0.9501
Table 5
Results of the average derivative of the log house price on the
log of the land-lease rent. Bootstrapped 95% confidence inter-




14 The intuition behind the method is as follows. First, it can be shown that
the realization of Wi for any individual can be estimated up to a scale by esti-
mation of the distribution function of LLi conditional on both Xi and Zi. The next
observation is that the main problem of the estimation of any object of log Pi
(such as the average derivative) is frustrated by the correlation between Ui and
Wi. In our case, it is very likely to be true that houses with a high level of the
land rent (i.e. with high levels of Wi) will also have a positive impact on the
level of Ui. An example of this is a nice view of the house, which is observable
by both the house buyer and the real estate valuer who determines the land-
lease rent. However, the exact view is unobservable by the econometrician and
hence not part of Xi. This problem can be solved by conditioning any object
(such as the average derivative) on the value of Wi. That is, we correct for the
unobserved characteristics that affect both the price and the land-lease rent by
introducing the estimate of Wi in a second-stage regression equation.
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Substitution of all of these assumptions and calculations into (2) results
in the following equation for the discount rate ρ:




exp( ( 0.02) 38.6).
Although this equation does not have a closed form solution, its solu-
tion can be easily found using a numerical solver. We find that our
results from the random effects regressions give a discount rate equal to
4.08% per year. The standard error can be calculated using the Delta
method and equals 1.12%.
This simple model can be improved in many ways. For example, we
can take into account that the level of c depends on the neighborhood,
while future land-lease rent payments depend on the inflation rate
minus 1% and not on the growth rate of house prices. Moreover, the
interpretation of ρ to equal the discount rate can only be made in the
case in which there is no lending and borrowing by the homeowners
(they therefore pay the price of the house out of savings). In reality,
many homeowners finance a house using a mortgage, implying that we
should take the interest outlays into account. More importantly, this
method implicitly assumes a linear utility function. Finally, if the
marginal buyer has a present bias, this will also affect the estimate of
the discount rate. In Gautier and van Vuuren (2018), we attempt to
overcome these concerns by explicitly modeling the dynamic utility
function of a home buyer and using a no-arbitrary condition that states
that the price difference between two similar houses with different land
lease contracts should reflect the expected differences in the value of
the current and future consumption streams.
7. Final remarks
This paper estimated the market valuation of land lease contracts
with different maturities. Our findings suggest that houses on private
land are, on average, between 11 and 13% more expensive. For houses
on leased land, each year that no land lease has to be paid (because the
previous owner already paid this in advance) increases the value of the
house by around 0.2%.
Our findings are important for cities that want to offer homeowners
new contracts or completely abandon land lease. In addition, the
finding that people do indeed care about payoffs that occur far away in
the future is important for policies that come with costs today and
benefits in the distant future (for example, policies to reduce global
warming).15
Appendix A. Description of the variables in the main regressions
Period of Construction
(0) Unknown or before 1500 (base), (1) 1500–1905, (2) 1906–1930,
(3) 1931–1944, (4) 1945–1959, (5) 1960–1970, (6) 1971–1980, (7)
1981–1990, (8) 1991–2000, (9) after 2001.
Maintenance inside
(0) Bad (base), (1) in between poor and bad, (2) poor, (3) poor to
average, (4) average, (5) average to good or not stated, (6) good, (7)
good to excellent, (8) excellent.
Maintenance outside
See maintenance inside for the description of this variable
Year
Every year from 1985 (base) to 2011.
Neighborhood
Dummy for all remaining 27 neighborhoods of Amsterdam
Location/View
(0) Not stated (base), (1) Next to large park, (2) Along a canal/
river/lake, (3) Next to small park, (4) Free view.
Heating system
(0) No heating system (base), (2) Traditional heating system, (3)
Modern central heating system, (4) Modern central heating system with
air-conditioning or solar system.
Type of house
(0) Simple, (1) Single family dwelling, (2) Canal house, (3) Mansion,
(4) Homestead, (5) Bungalow, (6) Villa, (7) Country house or cottage,
(8) First floor apartment (in small building) (9) Apartment in small
building which is not first floor, (10) Duplex apartment, (11) Apartment
in every sized building, (12) Apartment in large building, (13)
Apartment for elderly, (14) Apartment in small building, floor not
stated.
Insulation
Variable for the number of insulation techniques used in the house.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at 10.1016/j.jhe.2019.101646 .
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